

NEWFOUNDL ABRADOR BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 120 Torbay Road, P.O. Box 21040, St. John's, Newfoundiand and Labrador, Canada, A1A 5B2

E-mail: gyoung@nlh.nl.ca

2015-09-15

Mr. Geoff Young Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro P.O. Box 12400 St. John's, NL A1B 4K7

Dear Sir:

Re: Investigation and Hearing into Supply Issues and Power Outages on the Island Interconnected System – Phase Two - Requests for Information PUB-NLH-504 to PUB-NLH-532

Enclosed are Information Requests PUB-NLH-504 to PUB-NLH-532 regarding the abovenoted matter. The deadline for Responses to these Requests for Information (RFIs) will be set at a later time.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the Board's Legal Counsel, Ms. Jacqui Glynn, by email, jglynn@pub.nl.ca or telephone (709) 726-6781.

Yours truly.

Cheryl Blundon **Board Secretary**

/cpj Encl,

ecc. Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro NLH Regulatory, E-mail: NLHRegulatory@alh.nl.ca

Newfoundland Power Inc.

Mr. Gerard Hayes, E-mail: ghayes@newfoundlandpower.com Mr. Ian Kelly, QC, E-mail: ikelly@curtisdawe.com

Consumer Advocate

- Mr. Thomas Johnson, E-mail: tjohnson@odeaearle.ca
- Ms. Colleen Lacey, E-mail: clacey@odeaearle.ca
- Mr. Raman Balakrishnan, E-mail: rbalakrishnan@odeaearl.ca

Island Industrial Customer Group

Mr. Paul Coxworthy, E-mail: pcoxworthy@stewartmckelvey.com Mr. Dean Porter, E-mail: dporter@poolealthouse.ca

Mr. Danny Dumaresque

- Mr. Danny Dumaresque, E-mail: danny.liberal@gmail.comMr. Mr. William Kennedy, E-mail:wkennedy@kennedylawoffice.ca Grand Riverkeeper[®] Labrador Inc.
- Ms. Roberta Frampton Benefiel, E-Mail: rebnfl@gmail.com
- Mr. Charles O'Brien, E-mail: E-mail: bluegreenlaw@gmail.com
- Mr. Philip Raphals, E-mail: Philip@centrehelios.org

1 IN THE MATTER OF

- 2 the Electrical Power Control Act, 1994,
- 3 SNL 1994, Chapter E-5.1 (the "*EPCA*")
- 4 and the Public Utilities Act, RSNL 1990,
- 5 Chapter P-47 (the "*Act*"), as amended; and 6
- 7 **<u>IN THE MATTER OF</u>** the Board's Investigation
- 8 and Hearing into Supply Issues and Power Outages
- 9 on the Island Interconnected System.

PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

PUB-NLH-504 to PUB-NLH-532

Issued: September 15, 2015

PUB-NLH-504 1 Further to the response to PUB-NLH-468, please explain the potential 2 reduction in power delivery capability when operating in monopolar operation with a single electrode conductor in Labrador during high load 3 4 periods on the Interconnected Island System. In the response include the 5 amount of load shedding that would be required during worst case 6 conditions. 7 8 PUB-NLH-505 Further to the response to PUB-NLH-468, please state whether, given the 9 present design of the overhead line towers, it would be possible to 10 increase the conductor area to increase the power delivered to Soldiers Point such that additional load shedding would not be necessary taking 11 12 into account the maximum expected ambient temperature during high 13 load conditions and if so, has this been considered. 14 15 PUB-NLH-506 Please provide any studies that may have been performed with one AC harmonic filter out of service, and with a permanent loss of one converter 16 pole including results for loss of AC harmonic filters both at Muskrat 17 18 Falls and at Soldiers Pond. If no studies have been performed, please 19 comment on the possibility of AC voltage instability or collapse as a 20 consequence of overload operation of the HVDC converter. 21 22 PUB-NLH-507 Further to PUB-NLH-506, please state what measures would be taken to prevent problems caused by lack of reactive power provision at the 23 24 converter station during sudden overload operation. 25 26 PUB-NLH-508 Please provide an estimate of the annual number of outages that could be 27 caused by faults in the HVDC switching station and an estimate of the 28 repair time for faults at the HVDC switching station and the contribution 29 of such faults to unavailability of the Labrador Island Link. 30 31 PUB-NLH-509 Further to PUB-NLH-508 please describe the measures which will be 32 taken in the design of the HVDC switching stations to minimise the 33 number and duration of outages including the steps which will be taken 34 to protect the equipment from the weather conditions at the HVDC 35 switching stations and describe the steps that will be taken to ensure that 36 the HVDC switching stations can be accessed during all weather 37 conditions. 38 39 PUB-NLH-510 Further to the response to CA-NLH-110, please state when the exchange 40 of PSCAD models is planned and whether both Vendors are on-track to 41 exchange the models on the planned date. 42 43 PUB-NLH-511 Further to the responses to PUB-NLH-484 and PUB-NLH-494 and noting that the "Maritime Link, Preliminary Interconnection Study" dated 44 45 August 1, 2014, filed in response to PUB-NLH-264, stated that faults at Bay d'Espoir are accepted as "Exceptional Contingency", and therefore 46

under-frequency load shedding is permitted when this event happens, 2 please give a progress report on the studies which are planned for 3 2015/2016 to investigate solutions to this problem.

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5 **PUB-NLH-512** The benefit of being able to curtail the Maritime Link in the event of 6 problems with the Labrador Island Link or during major events in the Island Interconnected System is demonstrated in the "Maritime Link, 7 Preliminary Interconnection Study" dated August 1, 2014 filed in 8 response to PUB-NLH-264. Have any studies been performed in which 9 the power flow on the Maritime Link is reversed, rather than curtailed in 10 the event of problems with the Labrador Island Link or during major 11 events in the Island Interconnected System? If yes, provide copies. 12 Would such action be acceptable to the Nova Scotia AC network and has 13 the acceptability of such action been discussed with the Nova Scotia 14 network operator? 15

17 PUB-NLH-513 Further to the responses to PUB-NLH-482 and PUB-NLH-487, Hydro's definition of a bipole failure is quite different from the definition used by 18 19 Cigre, which counts only simultaneous (caused by the same event) failure 20 of both poles as a bipole outage. However, Hydro classifies the failure of 21a pole whilst in bipolar operation as a bipole failure. 22

Using Hydro's definition of a bipole failure is likely to result in a significant increase in the number of bipole failures, since one of the poles may be out of service for extended durations (days or weeks) because of maintenance, repair or simply fault finding. It is also likely to result in longer bipole outage times in the event of a failure of the remaining pole in service, e.g. because it is necessary to fault find and repair a much more complex system, and some repairs may take several days, if special equipment (e.g. cranes) has to be brought to site for equipment replacement.

Please explain why Hydro's definition of a bipole outage is different 33 from the normal Cigre definition and explain why a higher number of 34 35 bipole outages, than presently estimated by Hydro, would not occur.

37 PUB-NLH-514 Further to PUB-NLH-513, please explain whether there are any 38 conditions, not discussed in the responses to PUB-NLH-482 and PUB-NLH-487, that would be considered to give an N-1 starting position, and 39 for which Hydro would consider it to be permissible for under-frequency 40 load shedding to occur in the event of a single pole tripping. Please 41 include in the reply a discussion of the impact of operation with an 42 43 outage of an AC harmonic filter and operation with a single electrode line conductor. 44

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	PUB-NLH-515	Further to the response to NP-NLH-022, please explain why the ground wires have not been designed for the same radial ice weight as the high voltage conductors. Clearly, the ground wire would have lower mechanical strength than the high voltage conductor, and would therefore be more susceptible to breaking, and creating a short circuit, if the same radial ice weight accumulated on it as on the high voltage conductors.
8 9 10		In the response explain what the consequences would be of designing the ground wire for the higher ice accumulation.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17	PUB-NLH-516	Does heavy pollution (e.g. salt fog) or forest fires cause flashovers of the AC overhead line insulators? If so, what counter measures does Hydro take to cope with such flashovers? Furthermore, noting that HVDC overhead lines are more susceptible to accumulation of pollution on the insulators, what steps does Hydro propose to take to cope with such flashovers?
18 19 20 21	PUB-NLH-517	Further to the response to PUB-NLH-212, and given that an overhead line tower collapse is most likely to occur during adverse weather conditions please explain and justify the average repair time of 24 hours.
22 23 24 25	PUB-NLH-518	Please confirm that Hydro does not plan to operate in bipolar mode with the neutral point of both the converter stations connected directly to the station ground mat.
26 27 28 29 30 31	PUB-NLH-519	Further to the response to PUB-NLH-212, Attachment 2, please explain why steps have not been taken to reduce the estimated outage rate of the electrode lines to less than 2 per year, since the outage of the electrode line would result in a pole failure becoming a bipole outage, with consequent potential under frequency load shedding.
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43	PUB-NLH-520	 Please describe how steps will be taken to minimise the consequences of the following events on the performance of the Labrador Island Link. Please also state the predicted contribution to the outage rate and unavailability (monopolar and bipolar) of the Labrador Island Link of each of the following events. 1. Tripping of one or more AC lines at Muskrat Falls converter station. 2. Tripping of one or more AC lines at Soldiers Pond converter station. 3. Delayed clearing of faults in close proximity to the Muskrat Falls and Soldiers Pond converter stations, e.g. because of breaker failure. 4. Major faults e.g. fire or extensive insulation damage to one or
44 45		4. Major faults, e.g. fire or extensive insulation damage to one or more high inertia synchronous condensers, requiring major and

1		prolonged repair at times of high loading on the Labrador Island
2		Link.
3		5. Operator errors.
4		6. Major fires in the converter stations.
5		7. Major failure of 2 or more converter transformers, requiring factory
6		repair (such faults could be caused by latent defects or design errors
7		not detected at type and routine testing).
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9	PUB-NLH-521	Please explain whether the Maritime Link will be equipped with a
10		frequency controller, capable of controlling the Island Interconnected
11		System frequency and state whether or not the negotiations with the Nova
12		Scotia transmission system operator have included discussion of the
13		frequency control as potential ancillary service, and if so the response of
14		the Nova Scotia transmission system operator to this issue.
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16	PUB-NLH-522	Further to the responses to PUB-NLH-481 and PUB-NLH-482, please
17		confirm that Hydro will introduce operating restrictions, such that, when
18		the Island Interconnected System has stabilized after a single pole outage,
19		under-frequency load shedding will not occur as a consequence of the
20		failure of the remaining pole.
21		······································
22	PUB-NLH-523	Further to the response to PUB-NLH-488, has Hydro completed its
23		assessment of the need for additional reactive power compensation in the
24		Bottom Brook area? If so, what were the conclusions, and please provide a
25		copy of the study report. If not when will it be completed?
26		copy of the study report. If not when will the completed.
27	PUB-NLH-524	Further to the response to PUB-NLH-264, which stated that further studies
28		would be performed, please provide any additional studies that have been
29		completed since the Preliminary Interconnection Study. If not completed,
30		state the dates for expected completion.
31		state are anon for expected completion.
32	PUB-NLH-525	Further to the responses to PUB-NLH-481 and PUB-NLH-482, please
33		state whether it is still intended to rely on import on the Maritime Link for
34		provision of adequate power to the Island Interconnected System during a
35		bipolar outage of the Labrador Island Link. If so, please state the
36		maximum power that could be required from the Maritime Link.
37		maximum power that could be required from the Martime Entry.
38	PUB-NLH-526	Further to the response to CA-NLH-034, please state the progress that has
39	I OB-INERI-DAU	been made on the detailed action plan with respect to protection and
40		control to address the issues associated with breaker failure protection
41		system design.
42		system design.
42 43	PUB-NLH-527	Further to the response to PUB-NLH-483, please state what progress has
44	x U.D"1\x/XI"J#/	been made towards identifying the proposed new type of under-frequency
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45 46		load shedding and its setting, to avoid unnecessary load shedding, whilst still maintaining the security of the Island Interconnected System.
40		sum mannanning me security of the Island interconnected bystelli,

1 2 3 4	PUB-NLH-528	Further to the responses to PUB-NLH-482 and PUB-NLH-487, please explain the statement that the tripping of a monopolar scheme will be rare, and statistically will not occur more often than every 3 years.
5 6 7 8 9	PUB-NLH-529	Further to PUB-NLH-528, what is the estimated total number of bipole trips using Hydro's definition, and taking all causes, including tripping of a monopole, into account? The estimate should take into account both fault and maintenance outages of each pole.
10 11 12 13	PUB-NLH-530	Please state whether or not the Labrador Island Link and Maritime Link Vendors have benchmarked the PSS/E models against their PSCAD models.
14 15 16 17	PUB-NLH-531	Further to PUB-NLH-530, what studies have been performed with the new PSS/E models? What major differences in results have been observed? Please provide the new study reports.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24	PUB-NLH-532	Further to the response to PUB-NLH-275, please explain why a power supply from Nova Scotia of up to 300MW is assumed, since the limit of power delivery from a single pole of the Maritime Link is less than 250MW (250MW less the power loss in the converters (total about 2%), and the power loss in the dc cable, which is unknown). What would be the date of any shortfall on the Island assuming this reduced availability to 250MW on the Maritime Link?

DATED at St. John's, Newfoundland this 15th day of September 2015.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

Per Cheryl Blundon

Board Secretary